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LOCATION STRATEGIES BASED ON DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS: AN 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO SUPERMARKET LOCATION 
 
 









  In this paper we present a theoretic two-stage model for retailers location and 
consumers purchase decision. Retailers decision problem is formalized in terms of a zero-sum 
game, whose payoffs refers to retailers' market share and consumers decision problem is 
formalized in terms of a discrete choice model, based on random utilities. The theoretical 
models provide forecasting of equilibrium market shares and the locations to be chosen by 
retailers, in terms of the geographic distribution of the underlying location space 
(constituencies of the town), population distribution and characteristics (types) of the 
consumers. 
  
The theoretic model is applied to analyze empirical supermarket distributions on three 
villages of the Region of Valencia: Requena, Segorbe and Utiel. Departing from actual 
market shares in these three towns, a function relating types (young and older consumers) and 
sales is estimated. This estimate allows to calculate the payoff matrices for the location games 
corresponding to the three towns and to find out that there is just one equilibrium in pure 
strategies for each of them. A comparison of these equilibria and the actual location patterns 
of supermarkets, shows that our model explain quite well decision location but it can be 
improved to obtain more precise forecasts of actual market shares. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Much attention has been paid by economists to location problems since the
early work of Hotelling (1929). In this framework, a wide series of interesting
stylised models has been developed, which integrate location decisions with
decision on other strategic variables such as price, capacity, etc1. These mod-
els generalize Hotelling’s seminal idea by introducing (1) a more sophisticated
’geography’ (ﬁrms do not choose locations in a segment but in circumferences,
areas of a plane, etc., (2) non-linear transport cost functions, (3) alternative
cost functions for ﬁrms or (4) alternative decision variables, such as capacity.
In a ﬁrst moment, location theory appeared as an instance of diﬀerentia-
tion theory to relax price competition and to break the Bertrand ’paradox’,
i.e. the idea that two ﬁrms are enough for competitive outcomes. However,
the practical implications of these problems in many areas of management
and policy design made location problems interesting by themselves, both
from theoretical and empirical viewpoints. Roughly speaking, geographic
factors do inﬂuence both ﬁrms’ and consumers’ behavior. A ﬁrm choosing
a speciﬁc location creates a partial product diﬀerentiation, and generates a
surrounding inﬂuence area including neighboring households that choose to
buy the ﬁrms’ product.
The literature describes two main alternative approaches for modelling
the process that establishes inﬂuence areas (Chasco, 1997): descriptive-
deterministic and explanatory-stochastic models. While the former do not
intend to explain the factors that create inﬂuence areas, but to ﬁto b s e r v e d
data by ad hoc mathematical models, the latter are based on hypotheses on
consumers’ rational behavior, which decide the geographic market where they
consume after a utility maximisation process (generally, the minimisation of
commuting costs) given the location of the establishments. Explanatory-
stochastic include Spatial Interaction models (Huﬀ, 1963), discrete choice
models (McFadden,1977; Fotheringham, 1989), and models of Direct Utility
Evaluation (Louvi` ere, 1983).
The main goal of this paper is to establish a bridge between the theoretical
and empirical approaches. We depart from of theoretical models of both
consumption and localization decisions, and then we generate some simple
1For a general survey of the development on the theory of ’Hotelling’s models’ see, for
instance Brenner (2001), Harter (1996), Gabszwewicz and Thisse (1992), Lancaster (1990)
, Waterson (1989) and Osborne and Pitchick (1987), among others.
3forecasts to be empirically compared with the situation in real markets. Our
theoretical model considers simultaneously the interactions among ﬁrms and
consumers. Hence, the problem of identifying inﬂuence areas is modeled as
a two-stage decision model where ﬁrst ﬁrms choose their locations based on
their previous and private knowledge of the distribution of the consumers’
population and tastes, with establishment costs high enough to discourage
ﬁrms from changing their locations and in the second stage consumers choose
the establishments where to buy. We refer to the ﬁrst stage as the ’location
game’ and to the second one as the ’consumer choice model’.
To reach that goal, we need to establish some assumptions on:
• Geography of locations
• Competition models of retailers
• Choice models of consumers
1.1 The geography of locations
The spatial geography in which the location game takes place is a fundamen-
tal issue. The need of empirical testing forces to deﬁne a ’geography’ of the
underlying spatial framework that is realistic enough to allow contrastable
forecasting and adapted to available data. The need of realism implies to con-
sider location in the plane, instead of the usual one-dimension space more
commonly considered in the literature. The ideal underlying space is, then,
a street and road map of the analyzed towns. In this case, a consumer can
be characterized by a pair of real numbers, corresponding to the geographic
coordinates of the house where she is living. On the other hand, ﬁrms choose
a pair of real numbers within the area, representing again the geographic
coordinates of the selected locations, and establish their new premises there.
Although appealing, this model will not be considered, the reason being that
its information requirements to produce forecasting can not be satisﬁed by
secondary statistical sources: to deal with this model we would need to know
characteristics and preferences of a sample of individual consumers together
with their exact co-ordinates. Since we are constricted to the public sec-
ondary data, the smallest geographical unit for which relevant information
4is available are constituencies2 and, even on this aggregation level, the only
easily available data concern the number of inhabitants by age, sex, edu-
cation and nationality. In this paper, the geographical space is discretized,
consisting in a ﬁnite selection of locations (the constituencies). For our pur-
poses, we shall assume that the competing ﬁrms choice the establishments’
locations at the constituency level.
One of the most critical points in localization models is the deﬁnition of
the transport cost function. In the literature see (for instance, Brenner, 2001)
transport costs are deﬁned as a deterministic (usually linear) function on the
Euclidean distance between the consumer and the ﬁrms. However, a realistic
model should consider the topology induced by the existence of accidents
(natural or man-made) such as rivers or roads that invalid the Euclidean
formula for its use in the calculation of distances. Diﬀerent metrics such
as the ’Manhattan’ or block distance have been proposed for urban models.
Alternatively, these metrics can be summarized by the use of time instead of
spatial distance. This approach seems appealing for empirical applications,
since consumers are mainly concerned not on the spatial distance to reach
as p e c i ﬁc location but on the time they need to spend to get there. Then,
in our model of real localization problem, we deﬁne a distance between two
constituencies based on the average time that is needed to commute between
one and the other. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the distance function as the time
needed to go to the geographical center of a constituency to the geographical
center of another. We also assume that the distance from a constituency to
itself is not null and it depends on the time that consumers spend to go from
its center to its border.
1.2 Competition models of retailers
As a diﬀerence with the standard Hotelling approach, our model does not
consider an intermediate phase where, once localizations are chosen, ﬁrms
decide prices and communicate them to their potential buyers. We assume,
then, that prices for both ﬁrms are identical and exogenous to the problem.
Even if this hypothesis may look artiﬁcial and unrealistic, price exogenity is
one of the most common frameworks for practical in-depth location decisions:
2By constituencies we mean ”seciones censales”, the minimun divison used for statistical
purposes in Spain.
5Figure 1: Stylised representation of the consituencies in Requena (left) and Utiel
( r i g h t )a n ds u p e r m a r k e tl o c a t i o n s .
those made by the expansion departments of large retailing and restauration
companies. These companies set prices based on global competition strate-
gies that, most often, are close to those of their main competitors. Clear
examples of these situations, are Burger King / McDonald’s prices, or, in
a more local framework, Mercadona / Consum3 average prices. These uni-
form prices are applied with no exception to all of their current premises and
potential openings. Then, when two of these brands are considering to inau-
gurate new premises in a town, our model may provide a good description of
their decision making.
1.3 Choice models of consumers
Following an explanatory-stochastic approach, we assume that consumers’
behavior can be describe by a Discrete Probability Choice Model (McFad-
den, 1977). Formally, a probabilistic choice system (PCS) is deﬁned as
(I,Z,ξ,C,Θ,P)w h e r eI is the set of indices for the alternatives, Z the uni-
verse of measured attributes of alternatives, ξ : I −→ Z a mapping specifying
the observed attributes of the alternatives, C af a m i l yo fﬁnite, non-empty
choice sets from I, Θ the universe of vectors of measured characteristics of
3Mercadona and Consum are two Spanish supermarket ﬁrms that are sales leader in
t h eR e g i o no fV a l e n c i a .
6individuals making choices (the consumers), and p : I ×2C ×Θ −→ [0,1] the
choice probability function, such that p(i|B,θ) is the probability of alterna-
tive i being selected given that the selection must be made from the choice
set B ⊂ C and that the decision maker has characteristics θ ∈ Θ.
For the case analysed, I is the set of indices for market places (establish-
ments or ﬁrms locations), each of them with attributes Z that may include
the spatial coordinates, the selling price, amenities oﬀered, and other. Θ
may specify demographico re c o n o m i cv a r i a b l e so ft h ec o n s u m e r s ,o ra n y
o t h e ra s p e c ti n ﬂuencing tastes.
The distribution of tastes in the population of decision-makers (con-
sumers) is given by a probability measure µ(.|θ)i nt h es p a c eU(I) of utility
functions with arguments in I, depending on their characteristics θ.
The introduction of a supplementary random component in the utility
function leads to the Random Utility Maximisation (RUM) paradigm, exten-
sively studied again by McFadden (1977), which allows considering a popu-
lation of consumers with both known and unmeasured covariates inﬂuencing
their decision, and their distribution in a geographical space. The formal
integration of all information elements may be provided by utility functions
of the form
U ≡ W + ε
where W is the deterministic or systematic part of the utility and ε is a
random term, capturing the uncertainty whose sources are the unobserved
attributes of the alternative establishments, the unobserved individual char-
acteristics (such as psychological factors), measurement errors (for example,
of distances and transportation costs), and other.
MacFadden demonstrates that a PCS is compatible with the RUM hy-
pothesis (or can be generated from the RUM hypothesis) and a family of








for each B = {i1,...,in} ∈ C,and θ ∈ Θ.
Finding econometrically feasible PCS consistent with RUM is done then
by generating choice probabilities p from parametric families of probabilities
7µ.S p e c i ﬁcally, following Luce’s Utility Axiom (Luce, 1959) we assume that4
the probability to buy in retailer located in ik is given by the ratio of the
utility provided by the purchase in retailer placed in ik over the sum of







This model allows for introduction, in the evaluation of the utilities, of
explanatory variables for the individual decision, as well as interaction among
establishments.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows a very
simple example of the formal model, which is established in Section 3. Section
4 is devoted to solve the model and to deduce the outcomes to be empirically
tested. The empirical cases to be analyzed are presented in Section 5 and
the correspondence between the model outcome and the empirical data is
checked in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes the main results of the paper
and points out further research on these topics.
2E x a m p l e
Let us assume that two diﬀerent brands, say i and j,w a n tt oo p e nan e w
supermarkets in a town. Supermarkets diﬀer only in the trade mark and
consumers do not have preferences for any of these brands. The town has
two separate constituencies to be called c1 and c2. There are two diﬀerent
types of consumers in the town. Consumer type θ1 cannot drive and only
buy in the area where they are living, while consumers of type θ2 can drive
to any point of the town. Assume that the probability of a consumer of type
θ2 to buy in a given supermarket is proportional to the inverse of the time
they need to arrive from home to the location of that supermarket. There
are nsk consumer of type θs in constituency ck, k =1 ,2;s =1 ,2, and this
information is common knowledge to retailers and consumers. Both types
of consumers buy for the same amount of money, say 1 currency unit to
normalize. Finally, let us assume that the average time spent to drive to a
4Huﬀ (1963) proposed a similar consumer’s choice probability, but without considering
diﬀerent types of consumers.
8supermarket placed in the same area where a consumer lives is T,m e a n w h i l e
the driving time to commute to a diﬀerent area is aT,w h e r ea>1.
Let p(cl|θi,c k) denote the probability to buy in constituency cl of a con-
sumer of type θi who lives in constituency ck. From the assumptions, it is
easy to check that:
p(cl|θ1,c k)=
 
1 k = l
0 k  = l
p(cl|θ2,c k)=
  a
a+1 k = l
1
a+1 k  = l









k =1 ,2,l=1 ,2,k = l.
Supermarkets’ problem to choose speciﬁc locations to open their new
premises, may be modelled then as zero-sum game. Total sales of a super-
market depend then on its own location and on the location of its competitor.
Let us denote by πi(cl,c k) the total sale of company i =1 ,2 when supermar-





2(n21 + n22) k = l
n1l + a
a+1n2l + 1




2(n21 + n22) k = l
n1k + a
a+1n2k + 1
a+1n2l k  = l
The payoﬀ can be written as a matrix as follows, where supermarket 1










2(n21 + n22) n12 + a
a+1n22 + 1
a+1n21











9Thus, the supermarkets’ choice depend on the speciﬁc values of the game’s
parameters, nsk and a. For instance, for a close to 1, n11 = 100 and n12 =
10, then both players choose the same constituency, c1 and they share the
market. However, if n11 = 100 and n12 = 90, we obtain the Battle of Sexes’
payoﬀ matrix, where there are two equilibria, such that in both of them the
supermarkets choose diﬀerent locations.
3 The model
Consider an economy with a ﬁnite number of retailers and consumers. Each
ﬁrm produces or distributes an homogeneous good at zero marginal cost
whose price is the same, independently of the ﬁrm which provides it. The
set of retailers is denoted by R and for sake of simplicity we consider that
R = {1,2}.
Let C be the set of market places or constituencies, where consumers live
and retailers can be located. Let us denote by cr the constituency where
retailer r is located. Let d be a real function on C × C, satisfying that
∀c,c ,c    ∈ C (i) d(c,c )=d(c ,c), (ii) d(c,c  ) ≤ d(c,c )+d(c ,c   )a n d( i i i )
d(c,c) > 0. Although these properties only guaranty that d is a pseudo-
distance, we refer to d as the distance function among constituencies.
Let n be the total number of consumers of types Θ.T y p e s s u m m a r i s e
all the relevant characteristics of each consumer such as sex, marital status,
educational level, economic income, etc. For each c ∈ C,l e tπc : Θ → [0,1]
be the probability distribution of consumers types and by nc the number of
consumers living in constituency c, such that n =
 
c∈C nc.
The two-stage decision problem is structured in the following events.
First, each ﬁrm i = 1 chooses an allocation, simultaneously or following
a sequence (the location game). In the analysis we will consider two cases,
o n ei nw h i c ht h el o c a t i o nc h o i c ei sm a d e simultaneously, and other in which
we assume that the number assigned to a ﬁrm corresponds to its rank in the
election. Once both retailers are located, each consumer observes the vector
of locations (c1,c 2), and decides where to buy the good. Given a retailers’
location pattern (c1,c 2), consumers of diﬀerent types living in the same con-
stituency could buy at diﬀerent retailers. Let pc(ci|θ,c j) be the probability
of a consumer of type θ living in constituency c to buy to a retailer located
in constituency ci when the other one is located in cj.
10Finally, let Qr
c denote the amount of sales of retailer r =1 ,2i nc o n -
stituency c and Qr =
 
c∈C Qr
c. Since each consumer buy a unit of the good,
we have that: Q1
c + Q2
c = nc and Q1 + Q2 = n.
In the next subsections we formalise the two stages of the decision prob-
lem:
3.1 First stage: location game
In this steps, we have the model has the following elements:
• As e to ft w op l a y e r sR
• A set of pure strategies for each player, consisting of the set of feasible
potential opening constituencies C.
• Payoﬀ functions that assign to a location pattern (c1,c 2)t h em a r k e t
share obtained by the retailers. For each r =1 ,2,r   = r,t h e s e









if c1  = c2
Note that if c1 = c2 all consumers choose the same location to buy the
good and, since both retailers are identical including prices, consumers choose
each establishment with equal probability obtaining each ﬁrm a share of
50% of the whole market. However, if ﬁrms choose diﬀerent locations, then
ac o n s u m e ro ft y p eθ living in c will buy the good to the ﬁrm at r with
probability µc(cr|θ,c r) depending on the alternative locations to buy.










such that MSr(c1,c 2) ∈ [−1
2, 1
2] and represents the diﬀerence between retailer
r’s market share and a market share of 50%. We refer to MSr(c1,c 2)a s
retailer r’s market share hereafter. Notice that, after normalization, we have
that MS1(c1,c 2)+MS2(c1,c 2) = 0 and the location game can be considered
as a zero-sum game. Moreover, since retailers can guaranty 50% of the total
11amount of sales just by choosing the same constituency that their competitor,
it is clear that the value of the game, V ,i s0 .
Von Neumann’s Mini-Max theorem guarantees the existence of mixed
mini-max strategies for each retailer that provides them with a market share
equal to the value of the zero-sum game. Let ∆(C) be simplex consisting on
the distribution space over C, then there exists two probability distributions
over constituencies σ1,σ2 ∈ ∆(C) such that
























An important consequence of modelling the location game as a zero-sum
game is that the timing in which both retailer inaugurate their premises does
not matter. In other words if the leader retailer, say number 1, is the ﬁrst one
to choose location, the apparent advantage for being the ﬁrst one to decide is
illusory: the follower can immediately obtain half of the sales (a normalised
market share of 0) just by opening its premises in the constituency selected
by the leader. In fact, the follower may choose other location that provides
it with an strictly positive normalised market share.
Another important remark is that mini-max theorem guarantees the ex-
istence of equilibrium in mixed strategies. Since, in the empirical analysis, it
is only possible to observe the constituency actually selected by retailers, we
need to refer to equilibrium in pure strategies. We will see, however, that in
the considered examples there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
3.2 Second stage: consumption
We analyze consumer behavior within the Random Utility Maximization
paradigm introduced by McFadden (1977). To this end, we assume that each
player i of type θ living at constituency c has a utility function on C that
summarises her preference of buying a unit of the good at each constituency in
C. This utility function has a systematic part, depending on consumer’s type
and the distance between home and the retailer location, and a random term
that summarizes the eﬀects of other variables that could not be measured.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the utility of consumer i of type θ living in c to
12buy in a retailer located in cr is given by:
ui(θ,c,c r)=a(θ)d(c,cr)
−b(θ) + εi
where a(θ)a n db(θ) are functions of the type that determines the impact of
distance on utility and εi is a random variable, with expected value 0 and
unknown variance, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) among
consumers.
Note that higher values of b(θ) make farther locations less attractive.
Most of theoretical models follow the suggestion of Huﬀ (1963) and they ﬁx
b(θ) = 2 for all the consumers, independently of their types. However, this
is a strong and not very realistic assumption, since perception of distance
depends on characteristics of the consumer such as age or owning or not a
vehicle.
Since perturbations are i.i.d, for a representative consumer living in c and





Now, the probability of a consumer to buy in a speciﬁc retailer depends
on the whole location pattern (c1,c 2). By considering Luce’s Utility Axiom
(Luce, 1959), the probability to buy in retailer r is given by the ratio of
t h eu t i l i t yp r o v i d e db yt h ep u r c h a s ei nr e t a i l e rr over the sum of utilities of


























d(c,c1) is the relative distance of constituency c to the locations
of both retailers. Hence, Luce’s Axiom implies, for our utility function, that
the probability of a consumer to buy in a speciﬁc retailer is a function of
13the relative distance between retailers. Function b(θ)s u m m a r i s e st h ei m p a c t
of the characteristics of the consumer on her perception of relative distance,
and inﬂuences the probability to buy in each retailer.
Note that, for this expression of the probability distribution µc,t h es a l e s









d(c,c1)−b(θ) + d(c,c2)−b(θ) (2)
3.2.1 The functional form of b(θ)
Expression (2) shows the total sales of each retailer given a location pattern,
a population distribution and a distance function. All the elements in this
expression are measured and known, but the speciﬁc form of the function
relating the attitude towards relative distance of a consumer of type θ, δ
−b(θ)
c
needs to be established. To this end, some assumptions are made on the
functional form of b(θ). First, consider that type θ refers to a one-dimensional
characteristic of the consumer. Being sex, age and educational level the
available characteristics at the constituency level, since b(θ)i sr e l a t e dt o
the consumers’ mobility, we choose θ as the characteristic potentially more
related with attitude towards mobility, i.e. age. Hence, we may think of b(θ)
as a function relating the age of the consumer to her perception of (relative)
distance between the location of the two retailers.
We will assume that there are two diﬀerent attitudes towards distance
depending on age: the attitude of young people, less reluctant to walking or
driving a longer distance to go shopping, and older people, more reluctant
to distance. It is highly probable that most of the young people buy in their
working-area rather than on the living-area and may choose a retailer farther
away if it suits them. Older people use to buy several times along the week,
but do not commute out of their living-area.
Then, to simplify the model we consider the existence of two type of
consumers Θ = {θy,θo} where θy refers to young consumers and type θo to
the older ones. Let us denote by πy
c = πc(θy)a n d( 1− πy
c)=πc(θo). Finally,
assume the following functional form for b(θ):
b(θ)=
 
−2+β if θ = θy
−2 − β if θ = θo
14to reproduce a model close to that of Huﬀ (1963) where the attitude towards
mobility varies with the age of the consumer. Under this assumption, the














for young and older consumers respectively, where δc =
d(c,c2)
d(c,c1).F i g u r e 2
shows the shape of the probability function when β = .5a saf u n c t i o no ft h e
distance ratio δc, which corresponds to a S-shaped function.
It can be checked that
d(pc(c1|θy,δc))
dδc












are positive whenever β < 2. Moreover pc(c1|θy,δc)=pc(c1|θo,δc)i fa n do n l y
if δc =0o rδc = 1. Finally, note that
d(pc(c1|θy,δc))
dδc





















In conclusion, independently of β,
pc(c1|θ
y,δc) >p c(c1|θ
o,δc)i fδc > 1a n d
pc(c1|θ
y,δc) <p c(c1|θ
o,δc)i f0< δc < 1
Hence, when both retailers are at the same distance of a consumer, δc =1 ,
the slope of the probability function is greater for older consumers than for
younger ones showing an bigger aversion to the distance for the formers, i.e.
for a given increase in the ratio between the distances d(c,c2)a n dd(c,c1),
the increase in the probability to buy to the closer retailer in c1 is bigger for




0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0
Probability to buy to retailer c1 for a young cons
Probability to buy to retailer c1 for an old consum
Figure 2: The continuous line shows the probability of choosing retailer c1 as a
function of the distance ratio δc for young consumers. The dashed line shows that
probability for older consumers. Both lines cross at δc =1 , where consumers are
indiﬀerent between both retailers.
4 An empirical application to supermarkets
location
The goal of this section is the empirical application of the above model to
three examples of supermarket location in the Region of Valencia. Speciﬁ-
cally, our goal is the obtention of a simple estimate of parameter β and to
check whether the actual location of supermarkets gives the value of the loca-
tion zero-sum game. In this section, we present ﬁrst the sources of secondary
data and the methodology used to build the distance functions. Then, we
analyze the estimation of parameter β, calculate the payoﬀ matrix for the
location game and compare the actual locations with theoretical equilibria.
16We present the case of three middle-sized towns of the Region of Valencia:
Requena, Utiel and Segorbe, where in each of them there is one and only one
supermarket of both brands, Mercadona and Consum.
4.1 Methodology: secondary sources and ﬁeld work
For each of the three towns, the following information items were used:
1. A list and map of its constituencies,
2. The speciﬁc constituency where each supermarket is actually located,
3. The number of young (between 20 and 54 years) and older (more than
54 years) inhabitants living in these areas,
4. A distance function between constituencies,
5. The market share of Mercadona and Consum in each constituency.
The information referred in points 1, 2 and 3 was obtained from geo-
graphical and statistical sources of the National Statistical Institute, INE.
The methodology followed to obtain information items 4 and 5 requires fur-
ther explanation.
4.1.1 Construction of the distance function
Cartographic information at constituency level is not still available in a dig-
ital format for all constituencies in Spain. Thus, to construct this function,
we proceeded to delimitate the border of all the constituencies and to lo-
cate their geographical centroids on a cartographic map of each town. The
distance between two diﬀerent constituencies within the urban center was
estimated as the walking time between their centroids. If at least one of the
constituencies is located out of the urban center, distances are calculated as
driving plus parking times. On the other hand, since we assumed that the
distance function was such that d(c,c)  = 0, we calculated the distance from
a constituency to itself as the average walking time from the centroid to the
vertices of the polygonal formed by its border, when the constituency is in
the urban center. When dealing with areas out of the urban center, which
17consist of a set of disseminated and very small population nuclei, we mea-
sured their internal distance as the average driving and parking time from






walking time between centroids if c  = c
 ; c and c  urban
driving time between centroids if c  = c
 ; c or c  not urban
average walking time from centroid to vertices if c = c ; c urban
average driving time from centroid to farthest points if c = c ; c not urban
Estimates of the distance matrices are shown in the Appendix.
4.1.2 Estimation of market share
Information on sales of each supermarket is not available at the constituency
level. Hence, we estimated a proxy of market share deﬁn e di nt e r m so fc u s -
tomer shares at a speciﬁc time. We assumed that, at any time, the average
expenditure of the customers queuing in Mercadona is equal to that of cus-
tomers queuing in Consum. Then, the ratio of customers in waiting line can
be considered as a proxy of the ratio of the sales of both supermarkets.
We measured these ratios for each town every ﬁfteen minutes during an
hour (from 12:00 to 13:00) four diﬀerent days in two weeks (Wednesday
and Saturday of the ﬁrst week and Tuesday and Thursday of the second) in
May 2003. We obtained 16 measures of market share in each village. The
empirical application uses the average estimate as the actual market share
of both supermarkets.
The limitation of secondary demographic data, geographical sources and
market information should be overcome by further research.
4.2 Estimation of β
Parameter β summarises the impact of age in the perception of relative dis-
tances. Since we are dealing with middle-size towns in the same geographic
area, we assumed that this impact must be the same in the three places. To
estimate β, we need know supermarkets’ location and estimate the empirical
market shares in the three towns. These values are given by:
18Requena Segorbe Utiel
Location Share Location Share Location Share
M e r c a d o n a 2 70 . 4 5 1 40 . 6 0 3 10 . 5 9
Consum 22 0.55 14 0.40 23 0.41
Let us denote Mercadona as supermarket 1 and Consum as supermarket
2. Our theoretical model derives the total sales of each supermarket r =1 ,2,
denoted by Qr, given the distance function and the population distribution,
as a function of the aversion to relative distance β. Hence, we can write
Qr = Qr(β). Let MSr(β)= 1
nQr(β)− 1
2 be the market share of supermarket
r. It is clear that MS1(β)+MS2(β) = 0, so that the analysis can be limited
















































A comparison of this expression with the observed value of the market
share, provides an equation for β, for each town, whose supermarkets are
l o c a t e di nd i ﬀerent constituencies5. These equations may be solved by nu-
merical techniques, providing an estimate of the parameter β.S p e c i ﬁcally,
we have that:
MS
1(  βrequena)=−0.05 =⇒   βrequena =0 .61
MS
1(  βutiel)=0 .09 =⇒   βutiel =0 .72
5If both supermarkets are located in the same constituency, relative distances are one
and the model result is a market share of 0.5 for each supermarket. That is the case of
Segorbe in our application.
19As expected from the interpretation of the aversion to relative distance, β
is positive and its estimates in the two towns are close, supporting our hy-
pothesis of this parameter being constant in the middle-sized towns in the
interior of the Region of Valencia. In the following, we estimate β by the
average of the estimates obtained in both towns:
  β =
  βrequena +   βutiel
2
=0 .67
4.3 Payoﬀ matrices and equilibrium analysis
We are interested in ﬁnding out pure equilibrium strategies of the location
game. Although these strategies do not necessarily exist, we will check that
t h e r ea r eo n ea n do n l yo n eo ft h e nf o re a c ho ft h et h r e et o w n s .S i n c et h ev a l u e
of the game is zero, in equilibrium both brands obtain a normalized market
share of 0 or, in other words, a 50% of the total amount of consumers’ pur-
chases. Hence, equilibrium location strategies consist of selecting a location
pattern such that (1) each brand gets half of the total market of consumers
and (2) given the location of its competitor, there is no constituency where
the other supermarket could get more that 50% of all this market.
In the next subsections we analyze forecastings for the three villages. To
make the analysis clear, we only consider as potential opening constituencies
those in the urban center. In other words, we assume that a supermarket
brand does not choose small disseminate villages for its premises.
4.3.1 Requena
Applying expression (1) and (2) where   β =0 .67, we have that in Requena
(normalized) market shares for supermarket 1 are given by the following
matrix, where the row refers to the constituency code where supermarket 1
is located and the columns to the constituency where supermarket 2 opens
its premises:
20Table 1: Payoﬀ Matrix (normalized) for Requena
11 12 13 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
11 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,11 0,13 0,02 0,12 0,07 −0,03 0,08
12 −0,04 0,00 −0,03 0,06 0,09 −0,01 0,09 0,03 −0,05 0,04
13 −0,01 0,03 0,00 0,07 0,10 0,02 0,12 0,05 −0,03 0,07
21 −0,11 −0,06 −0,07 0,00 0,03 −0,07 0,03 −0,03 −0,10 −0,01
22 −0,13 −0,09 −0,10 −0,03 0,00 −0,10 0,00 −0,06 −0,15 −0,05
23 −0,02 0,01 −0,02 0,07 0,10 0,00 0,09 0,05 −0,06 0,05
24 −0,12 −0,09 −0,12 −0,03 0,00 −0,09 0,00 −0,05 −0,15 −0,06
25 −0,07 −0,03 −0,05 0,03 0,06 −0,05 0,05 0,00 −0,09 0,01
26 0,03 0,05 0,03 0,10 0,15 0,06 0,15 0,09 0,00 0,10
27 −0,08 −0,04 −0,07 0,01 0,05 −0,05 0,06 −0,01 −0,10 0,00
Notice that, since we are dealing with a zero-sum game, supermarket 1
cannot obtain an advantage for the fact of being the ﬁrst to choose loca-
tion. Hence, this payoﬀ matrix can be used to analyze the problems of both
simultaneous and sequential opening.
From matrix in table 1, it is very easy to check that there is only one
equilibrium in pure strategies, that consisting of both supermarkets choosing
constituency 26. To this end, notice that if supermarket 1 chooses the row
corresponding to constituency 26, supermarket 2 will choose the column that
guaranties the highest market share for it. Since this matrix shows payoﬀs
for supermarket 1 and the sum of both shares is zero, the best row for super-
market 2 is that showing the lowest share for supermarket 1: constituency
26, where supermarket 1 gets null payoﬀ. Of course, in equilibrium, both
ﬁrms obtains a market share of 0 (the value of the game).
Note that actual locations are given by leader supermarket (Consum) in
constituency 22 and the follower (Mercadona) in constituency 27. Even if
this location pattern diﬀers from the equilibrium outcome, the payoﬀ matrix
helps us to understand the process. Let us assume that Consum chooses its
location in terms of considerations out of the model. To create a market in a
town of the characteristics of Requena ,C o n s u mh a sl o c a t e di t sp r e m i s e si n
the very center of the town, close to the central market. Once this location is
public, the follower chooses the constituency that maximizes it market share
given its competitor location. We can see in the payoﬀ matrix that this is
21constituency 26. Although it does not ﬁt exactly with the actual location of
Mercadona, we can see in the map that it is placed quite close to this area.
4.3.2 Utiel
Payoﬀs for supermarket 1 in the location game in Utiel are given by matrix
in table 2, whose rows correspond to selection of supermarket 1 and columns
to those of supermarket 2:
Table 2: Payoﬀ Matrix (normalized) for Utiel
11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
11 0,00 −0,05 0,00 −0,17 −0,10 −0,17 −0,06 −0,18 −0,15
12 0,05 0,00 0,04 −0,12 −0,06 −0,12 −0,01 −0,14 −0,10
13 0,00 −0,04 0,00 0,06 −0,11 −0,15 −0,05 −0,16 −0,14
21 0,17 0,12 0,18 0,00 0,09 0,02 0,10 −0,01 0,02
22 0,10 0,06 0,11 −0,09 0,00 −0,06 0,04 −0,07 −0,05
23 0,17 0,12 0,15 −0,02 0,06 0,00 0,09 −0,03 0,00
31 0,06 0,01 0,05 −0,10 −0,04 −0,09 0,00 −0,15 −0,11
32 0,18 0,14 0,16 0,01 0,07 0,03 0,15 0,00 0,03
33 0,15 0,10 0,14 −0,02 0,05 0,00 0,11 −0,03 0,00
As in Requena, there exists just one equilibrium in pure strategies, which
provides both brands with half of the total market. Equilibrium in Utiel is
g i v e nb yb o t hs u p e r m a r k e t sc h o o s i n gc o n stituency 32 to open their premises.
This forecasting does not ﬁt with actual location pattern in Utiel, where
the leader supermarket chose constituency 31 and the follower, Consum,
constituency 23. However, we can see that location chosen by the leader is
very close geographically to that forecasted in the model, and that selecting
23 is not the best but a good response of Consum, given our payoﬀs matrix,
since it provides Consum with a market share higher than that of the leader
Mercadona.
4.3.3 Segorbe
Table 3 shows payoﬀs matrix for the location game in Segorbe. As in the
previous two cases, rows refer to selection of supermarket 1, whose market
22shares are presented in the table, and columns to the location selection of
supermarket 2:
Table 3: Payoﬀ Matrix (normalized) for Segorbe
11 12 13 14 15 21 22 31 32
11 0,00 −0,05 0,01 −0,07 −0,08 −0,06 −0,02 −0,03 −0,02
12 0,05 0,00 0,05 −0,02 −0,04 −0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03
13 −0,01 −0,05 0,00 −0,08 −0,09 −0,07 −0,03 −0,03 −0,03
14 0,07 0,02 0,08 0,00 −0,02 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,04
15 0,08 0,04 0,09 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,04 0,06
21 0,06 0,02 0,07 0,00 −0,01 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,05
22 0,02 −0,02 0,03 −0,04 −0,05 −0,04 0,00 0,04 0,00
31 0,03 −0,02 0,03 −0,04 −0,04 −0,04 0,00 0,00 0,01
32 0,02 −0.03 0,03 −0,04 −0,06 −0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00
As in the previous cases, there exists only an equilibrium in pure strategies
in which both brands select constituency 15 for their premises. Actually, in
Segorbe both supermarkets are located in the same constituency, number 14,
very closed of the location forecasted for the model. Note that Segorbe is the
only of the three cases where selection of constituencies can be considered as
simultaneously, since the opening of Mercadona (the ﬁr s to n e )a n dC o n s u m
diﬀers in less than a year and brands should have made their decision while
ignoring that their competitors were to open premises in Segorbe and, of
course, the location chosen for it.
4.4 Conclusions from empirical analysis
We can summarise the conclusions of the empirical analysis of equilibrium
in the following points:
• T h e r ee x i s to n ea n do n l yo n ee q u i l i b rium in pure strategies for each of
the three towns,
• This equilibrium is always ’pooling’: both brands choose the same con-
stituency for their premises,
23• In equilibrium, both supermarkets get the value of the game, consisting
of half of the total market,
• The follower brand can always obtain at least a half of the total market,
• Payoﬀ matrix partially explains location decisions of the follower brand,
• Forecasted location market is the same, no matter if location are chosen
simultaneously or sequentially.
As we can see by comparing these forecasting with the empirical facts,
the model seems to work quite good for Segorbe, where decision was made
simultaneously. In Requena and Utiel, where decisions were clearly sequen-
tial, the model fails to forecast the selection of the leader but it explains, up
to some geographical imprecisions, the response of the follower. On the other
hand, we observe that leader brand always keeps a bit more than a half of
the total market, meanwhile the model forecasts exactly half of the market
(in equilibrium) or even a bit less out of equilibrium.
In our opinion, these diﬀerences between theoretical equilibrium and em-
pirical actual locations in sequential decisions can be a consequence of one
of the assumption of the location game: to be a zero-sum game. We assume
that the total purchases of the consumers does not depend on the speciﬁc
location of supermarkets. However, this could not be the case ten years ago,
when leader supermarkets (Consum in Requena and Mercadona in Utiel)
opened their premises. Before these opening, all the market where served by
a large number of small retailers distributed among all the municipal term.
Hence, leader supermarkets choose speciﬁc and more appealing locations,
such as constituency 22 in Requena, very close to the central market and
in the middle of the commercial area of the town that is visited for a large
proportion of consumers, independently of the presence of the supermarket.
Hence, supermarkets may choose some speciﬁc location patterns, looking for
and increment of the total sales that consumers buy at supermarkets, instead
of at small retailers. The relaxing of the assumption of zero-sum in the lo-
cation game is one of our current research goals. This relaxation, and the
inclusion of some consideration on brand image, seem to be very powerful to
improve the model.
245 Concluding remarks
In this paper we present a theoretic two-stage model for retailers location
(stage 1) and consumers purchase decision (stage 2). Retailers decision prob-
lem is formalized in terms of a zero-sum game, whose payoﬀsr e f e r st or e -
tailers’ market share. Consumers decision problem is formalized in terms
of a discrete choice model, based on random utilities. These two alterna-
tive techniques have been selected to discriminate between the very strategic
behavior of a small number of retailers and the less strategic behavior of
a large number of consumers. The theoretical model provides forecasting
on the equilibrium market share to be obtained (the value of the remaining
zero-sum game) and the locations to be chosen by retailers, in terms of the ge-
ographic distribution of the underlaying location space (constituencies of the
town), population distribution and characteristics (types) of the consumers.
The theoretic model is applied to analyze empirically supermarket distri-
butions on three middle-sized towns of the interior of the region of Valencia:
Requena, Segorbe and Utiel. Departing from actual market shares in these
three towns, a function relating types (young and older consumers) and sales
is estimated. This estimation allows us to calculate the payoﬀ matrices for
the location games corresponding to the three towns and to ﬁnd out that
there is just one equilibrium in pure strategies for each town. A comparison
of the equilibrium and the actual situation of the supermarkets shows that
our model explain quite well decision location but it must be improved to
obtain more precise forecastings of actual market shares.
We consider that this improvement can be obtained by relaxing one of
the key assumptions in the model: the fact of the location game being a
zero-sum one. It can be assumed that the total purchases depend on some
characteristics of the constituencies where retailers are located and/or the
aggregate distance they must walk or drive to go from home to supermarkets.
Another improvement point to be analyzed is the assumption that, since
supermarkets have equal prices, consumers are indiﬀerent between buying in
each of them. Since leader supermarket is the ﬁrst one to open its premises,
it may create consumption habits or brand considerations that have not
been taken into account in the model, and could be the responsible of the
leader having higher market shares. On the other hand, our model should be
enriched to collect some facts of consumer behavior such as that they do not
overpass easily a location with a supermarket to go to another one, or the
25tendency to go from outer neigborhoods to the urban center more than from
the center to the outer zone (asymmetric distance function). The design of
a richer model, including all these considerations, and to test it empirically
in a wider set of towns is our goal in our future research agenda.
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267 Appendix: empirical data
In Spanish statistical system, constituencies are denoted by correlative one
digit numbers within each district. On the other hand, district are named in
the say way and we can refer to a constituency as a two digits number, the
ﬁrst one referring to the district and the second to the constituency number
in this district.
Requena
The municipal term of Requena is divided in ﬁfteen constituencies. Con-
stituencies 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 correspond to the urban
center and 31, 32, 33, 41 and 42 to clusters of very small villages around the
main urban center. Population and pseudodistances of these constituencies
are given by:

















11 12 13 21 22 23 24
11 7.6
12 7.6 3.8
13 11.4 4.8 3.8
21 4.8 9.5 12.4 2.9
22 8.6 9.5 11.4 3.8 3.8
23 14.3 15.2 17.1 8.6 6.7 4.8
24 9.5 7.6 8.6 6.7 2.9 8.6 4.8
25 9.5 12.4 15.2 3.8 3.8 4.8 6.7
26 19.0 17.1 16.2 13.3 9.5 6.7 8.6
27 11.4 7.6 5.7 9.5 5.7 11.4 2.9
31 21.0 21.0 18.1 21.0 21.0 21.0 18.1
32 15.2 15.2 18.1 15.2 15.2 15.2 18.1
33 21.0 21.0 23.8 21.0 21.0 21.0 23.8
41 27.6 27.6 30.5 27.6 27.6 27.6 30.5
42 25.7 25.7 28.6 25.7 25.7 25.7 28.6
2825 26 27 31 32 33 41 42
25 3.8
26 11.4 5.7
27 10.5 9.5 4.8
31 21.0 18.1 18.1 9.5
32 15.2 18.1 18.1 24.8 8.6
33 21.0 23.8 23.8 30.5 13.3 8.6
41 27.6 30.5 30.5 37.1 20.0 6.7 4.8
42 25.7 28.6 28.6 35.2 18.1 16.2 21.9 9.5
29Utiel
The municipal term of Utiel is divided in eleven constituencies, where
constituencies 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32 and 33 correspond to the urban
center and 41 and 42 to small villages near Utiel. Population and pseudodis-
tances of these constituencies are given by:













11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 32 41 42
11 4.5
12 2.7 5.5
13 5.5 8.2 3.6
21 13.6 18.2 10.0 12.7
22 8.2 10.9 5.5 7.2 5.5
23 10.9 10.0 10.9 13.6 16.4 8.2
31 7.3 8.2 8.2 18.2 13.6 16.4 5.5
32 12.7 12.7 13.6 14.5 20.0 20.0 7.3 11.8
33 14.5 15.5 11.8 15.5 16.4 21.8 8.2 13.6 7.3
41 18.2 15.5 18.2 18.2 18.2 15.5 18.2 18.2 18.2 5.5
4 2 9 . 11 5 . 51 8 . 21 8 . 21 8 . 21 5 . 51 8 . 21 8 . 21 8 . 21 4 . 51 1 . 8
30Segorbe
Segorbe is divided in nine constituencies, all of them corresponding to the
village, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 31 and 32. Population and pseudodistances
of these constituencies are given by:











11 12 13 14 15 21 22 31 32
11 6.4
12 3.6 4.5
13 3.6 7.3 6.8
14 10.0 13.6 6.8 8.2
15 10.5 14.1 7.3 5.9 6.4
21 12.7 13.6 12.7 13.2 17.7 3.6
22 10.0 11.8 9.1 8.6 13.6 4.5 5.9
31 9.5 9.5 10.5 12.7 16.8 4.1 5.5 4.1
32 6.8 5.5 8.6 13.6 15.9 8.2 7.7 4.1 3.6
31